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FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LAW, 
HISTORY, POLICY, AND POLITICS 
George Brooks* 
INTRODUCTION 
George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States 
when he won the state of Florida by 537 votes in the 2000 election.1  
Because the election was so close, hotly-contested, and divisive, aspects of 
our electoral system long relegated to dusty books suddenly became topics 
of water cooler conversation and cocktail party chatter.  Some Democrats 
speculate that if the nearly 600,000 felons in Florida2 had been allowed to 
vote, Al Gore would have been elected President.3
Felon disenfranchisement
 
4 has thus become a cause celèbre among 
liberals.5  There are approximately four million felons who cannot vote 
nationwide.6  They are disproportionately black and Hispanic7
 
* Dedicated to the memory of Alan El Naboulsy.  I miss you terribly.  The author would like 
to acknowledge the support and understanding of Professor Robert Kaczorowski. 
—
 1. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000). 
 2. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 3. Rebecca Perl, The Last Disenfranchised Class, THE NATION, Nov. 24, 2003, at 11, 
14, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20031124/perl. 
 4. For the purposes of this note, the term “felon disenfranchisement” includes any 
convicted felon currently incarcerated or ex-felon now on parole or probation who cannot 
vote. 
 5. “Civil rights advocates predict that voting rights for prisoners and ex-prisoners will 
be the next [U.S.] suffrage movement, as lawyers, prison advocates, voting rights groups 
and foundations have recently begun to join forces and take up the cause.”  Perl, supra note 
3, at 11. 
 6. One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1940 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote]; accord Brian Pinaire et al., Barred 
from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003).  Some estimates for the number of disenfranchised felons run 
as high as five million.  See Perl, supra note 3, at 11. 
 7. Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement—A Race Neutral Punishment for 
Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
359, 364 (2002).  This note focuses almost exclusively on felon disenfranchisement and 
African-Americans because of their history of enslavement and discrimination. 
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constituencies that have traditionally been Democratic strongholds.8  
Embittered by the 2000 elections, Democrats have seized on the goal of 
extending suffrage to felons in hopes of increasing their traditional voter 
base, thus helping them win close elections.9
Part I of this note places felon disenfranchisement in a historical context, 
highlights significant cases and jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, and reviews the scope of its impact 
today.  Part II considers the divergent interpretations of law that have led to 
uncertainty in the circuits as to whether the Voting Rights Act reaches 
felon disenfranchisement and when felon disenfranchisement statutes 
originally enacted with discriminatory intent have been cleansed of that 
taint.  The confusion in the circuits stems from conflicting views of what 
the history of felon disenfranchisement means and whether there are 
legitimate underlying policy rationales.  Part III argues that the Voting 
Rights Act does not reach felon disenfranchisement and thus the Fourteenth 
Amendment is controlling, therefore these laws are only susceptible to 
attack on constitutional grounds if they were enacted with discriminatory 
intent.  Thus, we are left with policy arguments, which are properly decided 
in state legislatures. 
  They face an uphill battle, 
however, as history, law, and policy weigh against allowing felons to vote. 
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY, JURISPRUDENCE AND IMPACT 
A. Early Origins 
Felon disenfranchisement has a long history, with origins in ancient 
Greece.10  In medieval Europe, it was expressed in the concept of “civil 
death.”11
 
 8. See Pinaire et al., supra note 
  In Britain, “outlawry” stripped a criminal of his right to 
6, at 1545-46. 
 9. See id. at 1545-47.  As many as three-quarters of disenfranchised felons could be 
expected to vote for Democrats.  CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE POLITICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF FELONY DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2001), at 
http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/papers/2000/disfranchise.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2005). 
 10. See Nathan P. Litwin, Note, Defending an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush 
Upheld Felon Disenfranchisement and Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 236, 237 (2003).  In ancient Greece, “‘[c]riminals pronounced infamous were 
prohibited from appearing in court, voting, making speeches, attending assemblies, and 
serving in the army.’”  The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and 
‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1989) [hereinafter The 
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons] (quoting Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of 
a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941 (1970)). 
 11. Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence 
of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 248, 248 (2000). 
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protection of the laws for his life and property.12  The first 
disenfranchisement laws in America appeared in the 1600s, typically as 
punishment for morality crimes such as drunkenness,13 and were present 
from the earliest times of the Republic.14
The power of the states to establish voter qualifications is found in 
Article I, Section Two of the United States Constitution, which provides 
that “the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall 
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 
of the State Legislature.”
 
15  States have “broad powers to determine the 
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, absent of 
course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.”16  The “wide 
scope” of power held by the states to set qualifications includes 
“[r]esidence requirements, age, [and] previous criminal record.”17
From 1776 to 1821, eleven states adopted constitutions that 
disenfranchised felons or permitted their statutory disenfranchisement.
 
18  
Virginia was the first in 1776, followed by Kentucky in 1799, Ohio, in 
1802, Louisiana, in 1812, Indiana, in 1816, Mississippi, in 1817, 
Connecticut and Illinois in 1818, Alabama, in 1819, Missouri, in 1820, and 
New York in 1821.19  Eighteen more states had followed suit by the time 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.20
These early laws rested on John Locke’s concept that those who break 
 
 
 12. The theory behind outlawry was that 
“[h]e who breaks the law has gone to war with the community; the community 
goes to war with him.  It is the right and duty of every man to pursue him, to 
ravage his land, to burn his house, to hunt him down like a wild beast and slay 
him; for a wild beast he is; not merely is he a ‘friendless man,’ he is a wolf.” 
Carlos M. Portugal, Comment, Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial Impact 
of Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1318-19 
(2003) (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 448 (photo. reprint 1923) (2d ed. 1898)). 
 13. Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right?  A Look at Legal 
and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236 
(2004). 
 14. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 18, 2004), at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 16. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959). 
 17. Id. at 51. 
 18. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 19. Id. at 450 n.4. 
 20. These states were Delaware (1831), Tennessee (1834), Florida (1838), Rhode Island 
(1842), New Jersey (1844), Texas (1845), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California 
(1849), Maryland (1851), Minnesota (1857), Oregon (1857), Kansas (1859), West Virginia 
(1863), Nevada (1864), South Carolina (1865), Georgia (1868), and North Carolina (1868).  
Id. at 450 n.5. 
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the social contract should not be allowed to participate in the process of 
making society’s rules.21  Other justifications included the prevention of 
election fraud, the fear that criminals would weaken laws and their 
enforcement, and a “purity of the ballot box” concept that felons lack the 
“moral competence” needed to vote.22  The Alabama Supreme Court 
vindicated felon disenfranchisement in Washington v. State23
It is quite common also to deny the right of suffrage, in the various 
American States, to such as have been convicted of infamous crimes. The 
manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the 
only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection 
against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against that of 
ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. The evil infection of the one is not more 
fatal than that of the other. The presumption is, that one rendered 
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of great 
moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to hold 
office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed by the State 
with the toga of political citizenship.
 on the theory 
that: 
24
B. Civil War and Reconstruction 
 
The aftermath of the Civil War wrought enormous changes, in both 
society and the law.  The Thirteenth Amendment, which banned slavery 
and involuntary servitude (except as punishment for a crime), was enacted 
in 1865.25  The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868; Section One 
contained the Equal Protection Clause and Section Two sanctioned the 
disenfranchisement of those who participated in rebellion or were 
convicted of “other crime[s]”.26
 
 21. Id. at 451.  Social contract theory states that “freely choosing” persons come 
together to create a society and government system that “protect[s] and promote[s] their 
basic rights and interests” by forming rules which each individual agrees to abide by.  A 
violation of the contract disturbs “the balance of rights and responsibilities,” leading to 
punishment, including the loss of the right to participate in the rule-making process.  Pinaire 
et al., supra note 
  The last of the Reconstruction 
6, at 1525-26. 
 22. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1302-03. 
 23. 75 Ala. 582 (1884). 
 24. Id. at 585. 
 25. The full text of the Thirteenth Amendment reads, “Section 1.  Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  
Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 26. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part, 
Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
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Amendments was the Fifteenth, which was ratified in 1870 and extended 
the franchise to blacks.27
While all three amendments are important for civil rights, the Fourteenth 
stands out as perhaps the most important constitutional amendment ever 
passed.
 
28
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.
  Section One provides that, 
29
The Equal Protection Clause in Section One has been the basis on which 
modern courts have been able to strike down laws and practices that 
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race, as stated or as applied.
 
30  
Section Two diminishes state representation in Congress as a punishment 
for states that infringe voting rights, unless those rights are abridged “for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime.”31
 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  Section 2.  
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, 
excluding Indians not taxed.  But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such state. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 27. The full text of the Fifteenth Amendment reads, 
Section 1.  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.  Section 2.  The Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 28. Bernard Schwartz, The Amendment in Operation: A Historical Overview, in THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CENTENNIAL VOLUME, 29 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).  Accord 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 1-2 (1988). 
 29. See supra note 26. 
 30. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 32; NELSON, supra note 28, at 2. 
 31. See supra note 26. 
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Due to ambiguities in Section One, Section Two lends itself to dual 
interpretation.  First, it can be viewed as a “remedy,”32 or perhaps more 
accurately as a punishment, by reducing a state’s representation in 
Congress when it violates a right protected in Section One.33  Alternatively, 
it can be construed as an implicit authorization to deny black suffrage; the 
“remedy” does not prevent a violation, it only provides a punishment for 
the occurrence.34  Politically, either construction would have been 
acceptable to the Republicans of the Reconstruction era.  Either blacks 
would have been enfranchised and would presumably have voted for 
Lincoln’s Republican party,35 or they would not have been allowed to vote, 
which would have reduced Southern—and predominately Democrat—
representation in Congress by invoking Section Two; thus increasing 
Northern —and mostly Republican—representation in Congress.36
Union troops occupied the Confederacy during Reconstruction and 
despite enfranchising nearly one million former slaves,
 
37 they continued to 
enforce laws denying the vote to convicted felons.  The Military 
Reconstruction Act of 1867 specifically exempted convicted felons from 
exercising the franchise.38  Before former Confederate states were 
readmitted to the Union, they were required to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment39 and bring their state laws into “conformity with the 
Constitution of the United States in all respects.”40
 
 32. NELSON, supra note 
  Upon meeting these 
requirements, Congress then passed enabling acts which formally 
28, at 57-58. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 50-51. 
 35. Id. at 47, 59 (noting an argument in favor of conferring the franchise on Southern 
blacks that “[i]t was expected that blacks would vote in favor of those who had given them 
their freedom and that . . . their votes would bring about the election of loyal candidates to 
Congress and the state legislatures,” and emphasizing that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
must be understood as the Republican party’s plan for securing the fruits both of the war and 
of the three decades of antislavery agitation preceding it”). 
 36. See id. at 50-51, 57-58. 
 37. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: 
Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 
259, 271 (2004). 
 38. See id. at 270. 
The Reconstruction Act enfranchised male citizens of [any former Confederate] 
State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color or previous 
condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of 
such election, except as may be disenfranchised for participation in the rebellion 
or for felony at common law. 
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429. 
 39. Chin, supra note 37, at 270. 
 40. § 5, 14 Stat. at 429, quoted in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 49 (1974). 
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readmitted a state to the Union.41  These acts placed “fundamental 
condition[s]” on states regarding suffrage.42  Arkansas provides a typical 
example, being the first former Confederate state to be readmitted to the 
Union, in June 1868.43
That the State of Arkansas is entitled and admitted to representation in 
Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following 
fundamental condition: That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be 
so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the 
United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the 
constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as 
are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly 
convicted, under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said 
State. . . .
  The Act of June 22, 1868 provided in relevant part: 
44
Despite the lofty goals of the Reconstruction era, Jim Crow came to 
dominate the South as Reconstruction ended, and blacks were socially and 
politically excluded from full participation in the life of the nation.
 
45  Their 
right to vote was systematically denied through use of poll taxes,46 
grandfather clauses,47 and property tests,48 as well as literacy tests49 and 
intimidation.50
The Supreme Court participated in this process by dismantling what 
Congress had accomplished in the Reconstruction Amendments.
 
51  The 
Court construed the Amendments very narrowly in the Slaughter-House 
Cases,52
 
 41. Chin, supra note 
 concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended only to 
combat discrimination against former slaves and gutting the privileges and 
37, at 270. 
 42. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52. 
 43. Id. at 51. 
 44. Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (emphasis added), quoted in Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 51.  Variations of this “fundamental condition” were also imposed on North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Mississippi, and 
Texas.  Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52. 
 45. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND 
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901 at ix-x (2001). 
 46. CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 389-90 (1940). 
 47. Grandfather clauses were considered advantageous because unlike literacy tests and 
polls taxes, they disenfranchised blacks but not illiterate whites.  Id. at 391-92. 
 48. Pinaire et al., supra note 6, at 1525. 
 49. MANGUM, supra, note 46, at 390-91. 
 50. Id. at 394. 
 51. HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 77-89 (1973); see also 
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE NEGRO 180-81 (1966). 
 52. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53  In 1883, the Civil 
Rights Cases54 held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to state 
action, thus declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional.55  The 
Court also restricted Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
by ruling that the refusal to serve a black person in a public accommodation 
was not a “badge of slavery” and thus was beyond Congress’s reach.56  
Justice Harlan’s dissenting argument that Congress could reach public 
accommodations under the Fourteenth Amendment would have to wait 
until the so-called Second Reconstruction began in the 1950s.57  Finally, in 
Plessy v. Ferguson58 in 1896, the Court validated the concept of “separate 
but equal” under the Fourteenth Amendment.59
Felon disenfranchisement was sometimes used as a tool by the states to 
disenfranchise blacks.
 
60  Some Southern states passed laws 
disenfranchising those convicted of what were considered to be “black” 
crimes, while those convicted of “white” crimes did not lose their right to 
vote.61  For example, South Carolina disenfranchised criminals convicted 
of “thievery, adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreaking, and attempted 
rape,” but not those convicted of murder or fighting.62  Mississippi 
modified its broad, earlier law—which disenfranchised convicts of “any 
crime”—to specifically target “black” crimes.63
Although five Southern states passed felon disenfranchisement laws 
targeting blacks from 1890 to 1910, more than eighty percent of states 
 
 
 53. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 104-07. 
 54. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 55. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 138-39. 
 56. CLAUDINE L. FERRELL, RECONSTRUCTION 58 (2003). 
 57. Id. 
 58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 59. MORROE BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS 76-77 
(rev. ed. 1967). 
 60. Mauer, supra note 11, at 3. 
 61. Theft was often considered a “black” crime and led to felony disenfranchisement, 
while murder was viewed as a “white” crime and did not lead to disenfranchisement.  See 
Litwin, supra note 10, at 238. 
 62. Id.  See also Chin, supra note 37, at 305 (quoting Ratliffe v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 
(Miss. 1896), where the Mississippi Supreme Court described blacks as “a patient, docile 
people, but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and 
its criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the 
whites.”  It therefore held that the state constitutional convention “discriminated against . . . 
the offenses to which its weaker members were prone . . . . Burglary, theft, arson, and 
obtaining money under false pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while robbery 
and murder and other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were not.”). 
 63. Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the 
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 540 (1993). 
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nationwide already had felon disenfranchisement laws by that time.64  
“[O]utside the [S]outh, disenfranchisement laws ‘lacked socially distinct 
targets and generally were passed in a matter-of-fact fashion.’”65  The 
Supreme Court twice upheld felon disenfranchisement as a punishment for 
polygamy in the late nineteenth century, noting it “is not open to any 
constitutional or legal objection.”66
C. Modern Era 
 
The full realization of equal rights, including voting rights for black 
Americans, would have to wait for nearly a century.67  As the Civil Rights 
movement progressed, various obstacles that had prevented blacks from 
voting were eliminated.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, 
eliminated poll taxes.68  New life was breathed into the Reconstruction 
Amendments—the Fourteenth Amendment became a “potent tool” in 
achieving justice for minorities.69
To correct the past failure of the Reconstruction Amendments to 
enfranchise African-Americans in practice, particularly in the South, 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which outlawed 
discriminatory voting devices such as literacy tests.
 
70  Section Two of the 
Act prohibited any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color.”71  Congress used its enforcement powers under Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment72 and Section Two of the Fifteenth 
Amendment73 to enact the Voting Rights Act.74
 
 64. Clegg, supra note 
  The Act was tremendously 
14.  The five states are Mississippi (1890), South Carolina (1895), 
Louisiana (1898), Alabama (1901), and Virginia (1901-02).  Shapiro, supra note 63, at 540-
41. 
 65. Clegg, supra note 14. 
 66. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890); see also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 
U.S. 15 (1885). 
 67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 69. William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 10 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). 
 70. Martine J. Price, Note, Addressing Ex-felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. 
Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 384 (2002). 
 71. Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 reads in full, “No voting qualification 
or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by 
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color.”  42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1965) (amended 1975). 
 72. See supra note 26 for the full text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 73. See supra note 27. 
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successful in extending suffrage to black Americans.75
Despite facing judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Voting Rights Act in the 1960s and 70s, felon disenfranchisement laws 
were almost always found to be constitutional.
 
76  Stephens v. Yeomans was 
the one exception, which found New Jersey’s felon disenfranchisement law 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.77  In Yeomans, the 
court could “perceive no rational basis for the . . . classification” of felons 
as a group that could not vote.78  In the subsequent case of Fincher v. 
Scott,79 however, a district court in North Carolina openly mocked the 
Yeomans court’s holding and reasoning.80  The Supreme Court itself 
seemed to acknowledge the validity of felon disenfranchisement but did not 
rule on the issue directly.81
 
 74. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1998). 
 
 75. From 1965 to 1968, the percentage of blacks who were registered to vote increased 
from 6.7 percent to 59.8 percent in Mississippi, from 19.3 percent to 51.6 percent in 
Alabama, from 27.4 percent to 52.6 percent in Georgia, and from 31.6 percent to 58.9 
percent in Louisiana.  FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE 
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 308 (1978). 
 76. See Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing Fincher v. Scott, 
352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Kronlund v. Honstein 327 
F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), 
aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969)).  Challenges have also been made under other theories, but none 
have been very successful.  See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (affirming dismissal of a felon disenfranchisement claim under the First 
Amendment because there is no private right of action therein for canceled voting rights and 
dismissing under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment because plaintiff’s restoration of his civil 
rights was conditioned on paying a fee, not his right to vote); Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. 71 
(holding that felon disenfranchisement does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it is 
a non-penal exercise of the state’s power to set voter qualifications and thus is not cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
 77. 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970). 
 78. Id. at 1188. 
 79. 352 F. Supp. 117. 
 80. Id. at 118. 
Holmes must have had in mind this sort of case when he penned his aphorism that 
the life of the law is not logic but experience.  For an excellent example, indeed, 
the only example, of the equal protection logic of plaintiff’s position, see Stephens 
v. Yeomans.  We admire the technique and would be persuaded by it but for what 
seems to us the compelling argument of history. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 81. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (“Minors, felons, and other classes 
may be excluded [from choosing senators].”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 
(1958) (holding that one “who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to 
liberty and often his right to vote . . . . [T]he purpose of the latter statute is to designate a 
reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the 
power to regulate the franchise.”). 
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D. Judicial Challenges Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The tension between Sections One and Two82 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was settled when the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. 
Ramirez83 in 1974.84  Three convicted felons who had served their 
sentences and completed probation brought a class action suit when they 
were not allowed to register to vote.85  The California Supreme Court held 
that disenfranchisement of felons who had served their time and completed 
parole—under provisions of the state constitution of 187986—was a 
violation of equal protection under Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because California could not assert a compelling state interest 
to justify the practice.87
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing the plain language of Section 
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its historical and judicial 
interpretation.
 
88  The Court held that the framers of the Amendment 
intended to exclude felons from the franchise.89  After an initial draft was 
rejected by the Senate, the language, “except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime,” was not changed despite several debates and proposed 
revisions.90  More specifically, although it granted that the legislative 
history bearing on the words “or other crime” was scant, the Court found it 
consistent with the clear wording of the section.91  Senator Henderson of 
Missouri felt that Section Two was an improvement on the earlier draft 
because disenfranchisement would follow for black and white alike.92  
Likewise, Senator Drake of Missouri had introduced the modifying phrase 
“under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State” to the 
Act readmitting Arkansas93 so that felon disenfranchisement laws would 
not be used to disenfranchise blacks.94
Despite contemporaneous decisions by the Court striking down state 
 
 
 82. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. 
 83. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 84. “The decision in Richardson is generally recognized as having closed the door on 
the equal protection argument.”  Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 85. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26-27. 
 86. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. II, § 1; art. XX, § 11. 
 87. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 27, 54. 
 88. Id. at 54. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 43-45. 
 91. Id. at 43. 
 92. Id. at 47-48. 
 93. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 94. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52. 
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voter qualifications on equal protection grounds,95 felon 
disenfranchisement was distinguishable because it receives an “affirmative 
sanction” in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment.96  Richardson 
held the framers’ intent to be of “controlling significance” in distinguishing 
felon disenfranchisement from other state laws restricting the franchise that 
the Court had struck down as violating the Equal Protection Clause.97  
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have been meant to 
bar a form of disenfranchisement expressly permitted in Section Two.98
In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall emphasized that there was no 
clear purpose behind Section Two and speculated that it was included in 
the Fourteenth Amendment for “political exigency” by Republicans who 
wished to either benefit from the votes of black Southerners or, if only 
white Southerners were allowed to vote, to dilute Democratic strength once 
Confederate states were readmitted to the Union.
 
99  The majority’s reliance 
on coeval laws such as the Reconstruction Act showed nothing more than 
that felon disenfranchisement was a common practice at the time.100  
“‘[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen 
like insects trapped in Devonian amber,’”101 however, thus allowing one-
year residency requirements, specifically permitted in the Reconstruction 
Act, to be struck down by the Supreme Court in modern times.102  Because 
voting is a “‘fundamental’ right,”103 any restriction must rise to the level of 
a compelling state interest under the Equal Protection Clause.104
 
 95. See id. at 54; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down state 
residency minimums for voting as violating the Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding Texas primary election filing fee is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (holding restriction 
allowing only taxpaying property owners to vote on municipal bonds violates equal 
protection); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (declaring school 
district limits on franchise to property owners or lessees or the parents of school-age 
children violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
  Marshall 
 96. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 55. 
 99. Id. at 73-74 (quoting William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the 
“Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
33, 43-44 (1965) (quoting JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF 
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 14 (1909))). 
 100. Id. at 75. 
 101. Id. at 76 (quoting Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972)). 
 102. Id.  See supra note 95 for a brief description of Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330 
(1972), where the Court struck down residency requirements. 
 103. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 77 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 at 336 
(1972)). 
 104. Id. at 77-78. 
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wrote that felon disenfranchisement did not meet this standard because it 
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to prevent voter fraud and because 
groups of voters could not be excluded based upon presumptions of how 
they might vote.105
Both the majority and the dissent claim the mantle of the democratic 
process.  Marshall observed that when the suit was filed, twenty-three 
states allowed ex-felons to vote.
 
106  By the time of their decision, four more 
states had done so.107  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, opined 
that whatever the merits of the policy arguments against felon 
disenfranchisement, it was for state legislatures to pass judgment on the 
persuasiveness of those claims.108
The ability of the states to bar criminals from voting under Section Two, 
however, is not without limit.  In Hunter v. Underwood, two plaintiffs—
one black, one white— challenged their disenfranchisement for crimes of 
moral turpitude, a misdemeanor, on the grounds that section 182 of the 
Alabama Constitution of 1901 was adopted with the purpose of 
disenfranchising blacks and that it had had that effect.
 
109  Alabama 
contended that intervening decades and the removal of egregiously racist 
provisions of section 182, such as the ban on miscegenation, had erased the 
original discriminatory taint.110
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that nothing in Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits intentional racial discrimination which 
otherwise violates Section One.
 
111
 
 105. Id. at 79-83. 
  Although section 182 was facially 
 106. Id. at 83. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 55. 
 109. 471 U.S. 222, 223-25 (1985).  The district court found that the disenfranchisement 
of blacks was a “major purpose” of the state’s constitutional convention, but did not find 
that it was the specific motive for the enactment of section 182 and thus found for the 
defendants.  Id. at 224.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the proper standard for a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of mixed motives was proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a “substantial or motivating factor,” 
unless it could be shown the same law would have been enacted in any case.  Id. at 225.  
The Eleventh Circuit found that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor and that there 
was no other alternative explanation.  Id.  Therefore, Alabama’s constitutional provision as 
applied to the plaintiffs was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.; see also Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 110. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33.  Alabama also claimed that section 182 had an 
additional, permissible motivation of  disenfranchising poor whites; the Court rejected that 
argument.  Id. at 230-32. 
 111. Id. at 233. 
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neutral as to race and was equally applied,112 it had been explicitly enacted 
with the purpose of furthering white supremacy, and continued to have that 
effect.113  Alabama had curtailed suffrage prior to 1901, but the state’s 
constitutional convention that year expanded the list of enumerated “black” 
crimes and added the phrase “crimes of moral turpitude” to broaden 
criminal disenfranchisement.114  This had the intended discriminatory 
effect: by 1903, ten times as many blacks as whites had been 
disenfranchised.115
The Court rejected an argument that intervening decades and the 
removal of explicit racism had legitimated the statute because the original 
intent and effect were still present.
 
116  It left open the possibility, however, 
that a facially neutral law “might overcome its odious origin” by 
amendment.117  Notably, the Court declined to decide whether section 182 
would be constitutional if it were enacted today without any discriminatory 
intent.118
The Hunter court left open the possibility that a law enacted with 
discriminatory intent could be subsequently cleansed of that taint by 
amendment.
 
119  In Cotton v. Fordice, the Fifth Circuit addressed the 
opening when it denied a Hunter-based challenge to Mississippi’s felon 
disenfranchisement law.120  Although the facially neutral Mississippi law in 
question was enacted with discriminatory intent,121 the court found it had 
been cleansed of that intent.122
 
 112. Id. at 227. 
  The court distinguished Mississippi’s law 
 113. Id. at 233.  At Alabama’s constitutional convention in 1901, the convention’s 
president, John B. Knox, said in his opening address to the delegates, “And what is it that 
we want to do?  Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish 
white supremacy in this State.”  Id. at 229 (quoting John B. Knox et al., 1 OFFICIAL PROC. OF 
THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALA. 8 (1940)). 
 114. Id. at 226-27.  The convention specifically targeted those crimes it believed blacks 
were more likely to commit, which resulted in disenfranchisement due to crimes of moral 
turpitude or other enumerated minor offenses that were “black,” while a conviction of 
second-degree manslaughter, a “white” crime, did not lead to disenfranchisement.  Id.; see 
also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 115. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. 
 
 117. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 118. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233. 
 119. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391. 
 120. Id. at 390.  Appellant Keith Brown was denied the right to vote while serving a 
prison term for armed robbery.  Id. at 389-90.  He challenged his disenfranchisement on the 
grounds that armed robbery was not specifically enumerated in the applicable statute and 
that the law in question was enacted with a racially discriminatory intent.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 391.  The state did not dispute this contention. 
 122. Id. 
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from the Alabama law in Hunter because Mississippi voters had 
affirmatively expanded their state’s law without discriminatory intent, 
whereas the Alabama provision was shorn of discriminatory-intent crimes 
by the courts.123
The Fourth Circuit is in accord on this point.  In Allen v. Ellisor, the 
court held that South Carolina’s felon disenfranchisement laws were 
constitutional because they had been revised and amended since being 
enacted eighty years earlier.
 
124  The court was also persuaded by the 
defendant’s argument that the amended laws post-date the Voting Rights 
Act and had thus been cleared by the Attorney General.125  Similarly, in 
Howard v. Gilmore,126 the court dismissed on appeal all claims brought by 
a convicted felon attempting to regain his right to vote.127  The plaintiff 
could not show that the state acted with intent to discriminate on the basis 
of race as the Virginia statute in question was enacted in 1830, predating 
black enfranchisement, nor could the plaintiff demonstrate any connection 
between felon disenfranchisement and race.128  Finally, in Perry v. 
Beamer,129
the Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to 
deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to 
vote who are entitled to vote by the Constitution herein recognized, except 
as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common 
 the district court observed that Virginia had disenfranchised 
felons since 1830, and had agreed upon readmission to the Union in 1870, 
that 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. 664 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1981).  The court stated that the plaintiff had not only 
failed to introduce any evidence regarding discriminatory intent in the original statute, but 
also neglected to address the state’s felon disenfranchisement laws as amended, referring 
only to the original provision.  Id. 
 125. Id.  Section Five of the Voting Rights Act includes a pre-clearance provision 
whereby certain jurisdictions with a history of discrimination and low voter registration 
figures must submit any changes to a voting “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure” to the Attorney General or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000); see also Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69, 69 & n.5 (2003) (explaining the requirements of pre-
clearance). 
 126. 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
 127. Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) 
(emphasis added).  Plaintiff brought claims under the First, Fourteenth, Nineteenth, and 
Twenty-fourth Amendments, as well as under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 933 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
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law . . . .130
Following the Fourteenth Amendment by just two years, the framers 
were silent if they objected, not just to Virginia’s provision, but to the 
“similar, or identical” provisions imposed on each Confederate state upon 
readmission.
 
131
The Supreme Court addressed how a plaintiff may establish a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in White v. Regester.
 
132  In 1973, plaintiffs 
challenged Texas’s redistricting plan for the state House of Representatives 
on the basis that it diluted the voting strength of minorities by creating 
large variations in the size of populations between districts and by 
establishing multi-member districts in two counties.133  The claims were 
grounded in the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.134
burden . . . to produce evidence to support findings that the political 
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group in question—that its members had less 
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
  White required the plaintiffs to produce proof of invidious 
discrimination; it was their 
135
The Court did not find invidious discrimination in the population 
variances,
 
136 but upheld the dismantling of the multi-member districts 
given the history of discrimination and its lingering effects on “education, 
employment, economics, health, [and] politics” in those localities.137
 
 130. Id. at 559 (quoting Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63).  See supra notes 
  
39-
44 and accompanying text. 
 131. Perry, 933 F. Supp. at 559. 
 132. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 756. 
 134. Id. at 763. 
 135. Id. at 765-66. 
 136. Id. at 763. 
 137. Id. at 767-69.  The court wrote: 
Surveying the historic and present condition of the Bexar County Mexican-
American community . . . the Bexar community, along with other Mexican- 
Americans in Texas, had long “suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the 
results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of 
education, employment, economics, health, politics and others.”  The bulk of the 
Mexican-American community in Bexar County occupied the Barrio, an area 
consisting of about twenty-eight contiguous census tracts in the city of San 
Antonio.  Over seventy-eight percent of Barrio residents were Mexican-
Americans, making up twenty-nine percent of the county’s total population. The 
Barrio is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income and a high rate of 
unemployment.  The typical Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language 
barrier that makes his participation in community processes extremely difficult, 
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Nipper v. Smith elaborated on the White decision, remarking that, 
the Supreme Court approved the district court’s use of several objective 
factors to determine whether the plaintiffs had met this burden of proof.  
Those factors included the state’s history of official racial discrimination; 
the use of certain voting structures that, although not in themselves 
improper or invidious, nevertheless enhanced the opportunity for racial 
discrimination; the influence of all-white political organizations over the 
process; and the use of overt racial campaign tactics to defeat candidates 
supported by the black community.138
The issue of the scope of Congress’s remedial powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment arose in City of Boerne v. Flores
 
139 in 1993.140  
The Landmark Commission and City Council of Boerne, Texas denied a 
building permit to the Archbishop of San Antonio to expand a mission-
style church because it was part of a historic district.141  The Archbishop 
sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),142 which 
prohibited “‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’” free exercise 
of religion absent proof the burden was a compelling interest and was the 
“‘least restrictive means of furthering’” the interest.143  Congress relied on 
its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to impose RFRA 
on the states.144  The Court noted that Congress was not reacting to and did 
not document any “widespread pattern of religious discrimination.”145  For 
Congress to act, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.”146  The Court thus struck down RFRA.147
 
 
 
particularly, the court thought, with respect to the political life of Bexar County.  
“(A) cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with the poll tax and the most 
restrictive voter registration procedures in the nation have operated to effectively 
deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in Texas . . . .” 
Id. at 767-68 (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 728-31 (W.D. Tex. 1972)). 
 138. 39 F.3d 1494, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 139. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 140. Karlan, supra note 74, at 725. 
 141. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
 143. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting § 2000bb-1). 
 144. Id. at 516. 
 145. Id. at 531.  The Court elaborated further on this point in Board of Trustees of 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, stating that Congress must “identify the “history and 
pattern” of unconstitutional . . .discrimination” to be remedied.  531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001), 
discussed in Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 146. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
 147. Id. at 511. 
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E. Judicial Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act and Congressional 
Action 
The Supreme Court limited the effect of the Voting Rights Act in 1980 
when it required intent to be proven for a violation.148  In City of Mobile, 
Alabama v. Bolden, the city’s black residents challenged the at-large voting 
system for electing city commissioners on the grounds that it diluted their 
voting strength.149  The Supreme Court held that Section Two of the 
Voting Rights Act “no more than elaborates” on the Fifteenth 
Amendment.150  The Amendment did not confer a new right of suffrage on 
anyone; rather, it granted a new right to vote that cannot be infringed due to 
discrimination based on race, which Congress is empowered to protect.151  
It was already well established that a facially neutral law is only a violation 
of the Fifteenth Amendment if it is motivated by discriminatory intent.152  
The same holds true for claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment; 
it is a “basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can 
there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”153  Thus, in its 
decision, the Court read an intent requirement into Section Two of the 
Voting Rights Act.154
The new intent requirement established in Bolden was unpopular 
because of the burden it placed on plaintiffs.
 
155
 
 148. Price, supra note 
  Reaction in Congress came 
70, at 385. 
 149. 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980). 
 150. Id. at 60-61. 
 151. Id. at 61-62; see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Neal v. Del. 103 
U.S. 370 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 152. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62-63; see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) 
(upholding a gerrymander because discriminatory intent was not proven); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (deeming racially gerrymandered election districts 
unconstitutional because they were intended to dilute the black vote); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down a grandfather clause because it lacked any 
reasonable basis and had no purpose but to avoid the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 153. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66. 
 154. See Price, supra note 70, at 385. 
 155. See Portugal, supra note 12, at 1328.  The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act comments on the changes: 
The proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is designed to 
restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bolden.  In pre-Bolden cases plaintiffs could prevail 
by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total 
circumstances of the local electoral process, had the result of denying a racial or 
language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process.  Under 
this results test, it was not necessary to demonstrate that the challenged election 
law or procedure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.  
In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent and substantially 
increased the burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring 
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in the form of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act just two years later, 
in 1982.156
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color . . . .
  The revised Section Two has a “results test”: 
157
A violation is proven if “based on the totality of the circumstances, it is 
shown that  . . . members [of protected racial minorities] have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
 
158  This may 
be due to either an individual’s denial of the vote based on race or dilution 
of a group’s vote based on race.159
The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments included a list 
of “typical factors” that may be relevant in determining whether Section 
Two has been violated in the totality of the circumstances.
 
160
 
proof of discriminatory purpose.  The committee has concluded that this intent test 
places an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs.  It diverts the judicial injury 
from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral 
process to a historical question of individual motives.  
In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a prerequisite to 
establishing a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Therefore, the 
committee has amended Section 2 to permit plaintiffs to prove violations by 
showing that minority voters were denied an equal chance to participate in the 
political process, i.e., by meeting the pr[e]-Bolden results test. 
  These 
include any history of official discrimination related to voting rights; racial 
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15-16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192-93. 
 156. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1328. 
 157. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)) (emphasis added). 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965).  Subsection (b) reads in full: 
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this 
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.  The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to 
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be 
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965). 
 159. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1663, 1671 (2001). 
 160. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 114 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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polarization in voting; voting laws or practices such as large election 
districts that can be used for discrimination; access to the candidate slating 
process; ongoing effects of discrimination in “education, employment and 
health” affecting political participation; racial appeals in campaigns; 
election of minorities to public office; lack of responsiveness by elected 
officials to minority concerns; and the policies underlying any voting law 
or practice.161  These factors were derived from White.162
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the 1982 
amendments in Thornburg v. Gingles.
 
163  Black voters in North Carolina 
challenged the use of multi-member districts in a reapportioned legislative 
districting plan, claiming it violated their ability to “elect representatives of 
their choice” in violation of the amended Section Two of the Voting Rights 
Act.164  After the suit was filed, but before trial, Congress amended Section 
Two of the Act to remove any intent requirement established by Bolden 
and instead allow a violation to be proven by discriminatory effect.165  
When examining the totality of the circumstances for an alleged Section 
Two violation of the Act, the Court in Thornburg cautioned that the 
“typical factors” identified by the Senate were not exhaustive.166  The 1982 
amendments returned the legal standard to the pre-Bolden “results test” of 
White.167
 
 161. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07. 
  Except for one district, the Court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that the totality of the circumstances and multi-member voting 
districts constituted a violation of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act 
because it impaired the ability of black voters to “elect representatives of 
 162. “These factors are derived from the analytical framework used by the Supreme 
Court in White, as articulated in Zimmer.”  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 n.113.  See supra notes 
132-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); 
see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 163. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 164. Id. at 34-35. 
 165. Id. at 35. 
 166. Id. at 45.  Thornburg distilled the Senate report factors to the two most important for 
vote dilution claims in the context of multi-member electoral districts: “[R]acially polarized 
voting and minority electoral success.”  Shapiro, supra note 63, at 559 n.122.  It established 
a three-prong test for establishing a violation under the Voting Rights Act: (1) the minority 
group must be “‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a 
single-member district,’” (2) the group must be “‘politically cohesive,’” and (3) the 
“majority had to vote as a bloc so that it ‘usually . . . defeat[ed] the minority’s preferred 
candidate.’”  Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51).  The Gingles test, 
however, probably only applies to the context of districting, not felon disenfranchisement.  
Id. (citing BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR 
VOTING EQUALITY 59 (1992)). 
 167. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 40 n.8. 
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their choice.”168  The Court considered socioeconomic factors such as 
income, education, and living conditions.169
The same year as Thornburg, the Sixth Circuit directly examined felon 
disenfranchisement in the totality of the circumstances context.  In Wesley 
v. Collins,
 
170 an African-American convict brought suit challenging his 
disenfranchisement under Tennessee law as a violation of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act.171  The Sixth 
Circuit found no violation of the Voting Rights Act despite the presence of 
some plus factors —including disparate impact on blacks and a history of 
discrimination—cutting in favor of discriminatory effect, but not in the 
totality of the circumstances.172  Other factors tipped the balance in the 
other direction, foremost among which was the fact that there was a 
“legitimate and compelling rationale” for disenfranchising felons.173  After 
all, a felon’s right to vote is not fundamental.174
F.  The Status and Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Today 
 
Today, forty-eight states have some sort of felon disenfranchisement law 
 
 168. Id. at 80. 
 169. Id. at 65-66. 
To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which blacks 
and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this 
case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2. 
The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and 47.8% of the 
black community lives in poverty.  More than half— 51.5%—of black adults over 
the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less.  Just over half of black 
citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units.  And, almost a third 
of all black households are without a car.  In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in 
the district live below the poverty line.  Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042.  
White residents are better educated than blacks—only 25.6% of whites over the 
age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less.  Furthermore, only 26.2% 
of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households with no vehicle 
available.  As is the case in Senate District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban 
district have never been able to elect a representative of their choice. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 170. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 171. Id. at 1257. 
 172. Id. at 1261. 
 173. Id.  The court noted the early Lockean rationale of many felon disenfranchisement 
laws, to explain that it is rational to exclude lawbreakers from the selection of lawmakers 
and law enforcers.  Id. at 1261-62 (quoting Green v. Board of Elections of New York, 380 
F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 174. Id. at 1261; see also Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Plaintiff’s 
argument fails because the right of convicted felons to vote is not ‘fundamental’.’  That was 
precisely the argument rejected in Richardson”. 
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on their books; only Maine and Vermont have no such restriction.175  The 
laws range from permanent disenfranchisement in Alabama176 to automatic 
restoration of voting rights upon completion of prison time, parole or 
probation in New Mexico.177  Three states permanently disenfranchise 
felons, ten temporarily disenfranchise them, and thirty-six deny the vote to 
paroled felons.178  Even states that “permanently” disenfranchise convicted 
felons provide a mechanism for restoration of those rights, however, 
usually by application to a board of the executive branch.179
Currently, approximately 3.9 million people nationwide cannot vote due 
to felony convictions;
 
180 about one in fifty adults.181  A side effect of high 
minority crime rates182 is that those disenfranchised are disproportionately 
black or Hispanic.183  Nearly 1.4 million black Americans (thirteen percent 
of all black men) cannot vote due to felon disenfranchisement.184  In 
Florida and Alabama, nearly one-third of black men cannot vote.185
 
 175. See One Person, No Vote, supra note 
  
6, at 1942.  Convicted felons currently serving 
prison sentences can vote in Maine and Vermont.  Id. 
 176. See id. at 1943-44. 
 177. Id. at 1949. 
 178. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (Sept. 2005), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf. 
 179. See One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1943.  This comment does not explore the 
subject of restoration of voting rights and the process entailed therein, but it should be noted 
that such an option may be or have been available to many of the plaintiffs discussed here.  
See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 106-07 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004); Farrakhan v. 
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 
1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003); and Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257. 
 180. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 181. Pinaire et al., supra note 6, at 1520. 
 182. Causation of high crime rates by minorities is arguable, whether attributed to 
poverty, lack of education, or discrimination.  But the statistics clearly establish that African 
Americans are arrested at disproportionate rates; in 2003, blacks accounted for 27.0 percent 
of arrests.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2003: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 288 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf.  African Americans are also 
disproportionately victims of crime; for example, 47.8 percent of murder victims in 2003 
were black.  See id. at 17.  African Americans, however, accounted for 12.3 percent of the 
American population in 2000.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 U.S. CENSUS: PEOPLE 
QUICKFACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Sept. 30, 
2005).  “These disparities are probably due in part to underlying disparities in criminal 
behavior.”  ADVISORY BOARD TO THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE: THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE: THE 
ADVISORY BOARD’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 77 (Sept. 1998), at 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica/PIR.pdf. 
 183. Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 
85, 86 (2004); see also Price, supra note 70, at 374-75 & n. 17. 
 184. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 370. 
 185. See Price, supra note 70, at 375. 
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African American men as a group account for nearly thirty-six percent of 
all those disenfranchised nationwide.186
II. CONFLICT AND CHAOS IN THE CIRCUITS 
 
A. Second Circuit: Baker v. Pataki and Muntaqim v. Coombe 
The Second Circuit first examined the issue of felon disenfranchisement 
in the context of the Voting Rights Act in Baker v. Pataki.187  The district 
court refused to apply the results test of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.188  On 
appeal, five judges concluded that the results test of Section Two did not 
reach New York’s law due to concerns that it would “raise serious 
constitutional questions regarding the scope of Congress’ authority to 
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”189  The court was 
evenly split, five-to-five.190
Judge Mahoney wrote that the framers of the Voting Rights Act and its 
1982 amendments did not intend to outlaw felon disenfranchisement
 
191 and 
had not found that felon disenfranchisement laws were a pretext for racial 
discrimination.192  The legislative history from 1965 of both houses of 
Congress was explicit on this point: “[The Voting Rights Act] ‘does not 
proscribe a requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State 
that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction 
of a felony.’”193  Further, applying Section Two’s results test to a felon 
disenfranchisement statute would raise constitutional issues.194  Although 
the test was enacted using the enforcement mechanisms of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, it is “settled” that those amendments can be 
violated only where there is purposeful discrimination.195
 
 186. Id. at 374-75. 
  Where a statute 
may act to upset the normal balance of Constitutional federalism, a “clear 
statement” from Congress is required that that is in fact the intended 
 187. 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (5-5 decision). 
 188. Id. at 921.  See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Portugal, supra 
note 12, at 1329.  When the litigation began, then-Governor Mario Cuomo was the 
defendant; he was replaced by Governor George Pataki.  Baker, 85 F.3d at 923 n.4. 
 189. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d at 922. 
 190. Id. at 921. 
 191. Id. at 932. 
 192. Id. at 929. 
 193. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 11-12 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2437, 2457). 
 194. Id. at 922. 
 195. Id. at 926. 
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result.196  Applying the “plain statement rule,” since Congress was not 
unmistakably clear that it wanted to alter the balance between the state and 
federal governments, the Voting Rights Act should not be so construed.197
Judge Feinberg took the opposing view.
 
198  He contended that Congress 
is empowered to take remedial action under the Fourteenth Amendment 
where there is a racially discriminatory result.199  Since the Court had 
already struck down a felon disenfranchisement law based on race under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Hunter v. Underwood, he saw no reason why 
Congress could not use its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to “bar racially discriminatory results” under the 
Voting Rights Act.200  The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to 
upset the balance between the state and federal governments and had 
already had that effect.201  This renders the “plain statement rule” question 
moot, since the federal balance had already been altered.202  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has already said that the “plain statement rule” does not 
apply to Section Two of the Voting Rights Act and would, in any case, 
would only apply if the statute were vague, which it is not.203
The split in the Baker decision left the status of felon disenfranchisement 
unsettled in the Second Circuit.  In Muntaqim v. Coombe, Jalil Muntaqim, a 
black felon, brought suit against New York State Correctional Services for 
denying him the right to vote.
 
204
 
 196. Id. at 930; see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see also 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its 
intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”) (quoting Atascadero 
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
  He claimed New York’s statute violated 
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act because it “results in a denial or 
 197. Baker, 85 F.3d at 922. 
 198. Id. at 934. 
 199. Id. at 937. 
 200. Id.  For a discussion of the Hunter decision, see supra notes 109-118 and 
accompanying text. 
 201. Baker, 85 F.3d at 938; see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 202. Baker, 85 F.3d at 938-39. 
 203. Id.; see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 390-404 (1991) (interpreting of the 
Voting Rights Act without reference to the plain statement rule).  Judge Mahoney’s 
response in Baker was that 
[i]n light of the unequivocal language in Gregory that the plain statement rule 
does apply in the context of legislation passed pursuant to the enforcement clauses 
of the Civil War Amendments, we decline to interpret this omission—made 
without any attempt to distinguish Gregory—as an instruction to the lower courts 
to refrain from applying Gregory in the context of the Voting Rights Act. 
85 F.3d at 932. 
 204. 366 F.3d 102, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color.”205  In a unanimous decision, the court held that 
the Voting Rights Act did not reach New York’s felon disenfranchisement 
law, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit validation of the 
practice in Section Two, its widespread use since before the Civil War, and 
the principle that laws should not be construed to alter the balance of 
federalism unless Congress demands so explicitly.206
The court reasoned that the Voting Rights Act did not totally eliminate 
the need to show purposeful discrimination because the 1982 amendments 
eliminated the intent requirement of Bolden and returned to the pre-Bolden 
standard, which required proof of invidious discrimination, as the court 
held in White v. Regester.
 
207  Under White, the plaintiff does not have to 
show subjective discriminatory intent on the part of lawmakers, but instead 
“objective factors” are used to demonstrate an “electoral scheme interacts 
with racial bias in the community and allows that bias to dilute the voting 
strength of the minority group.”208  Applying this standard, the court found 
that the statistics proffered by the plaintiff did not prove there was a 
relationship between being black and being disenfranchised; they only 
showed that a disproportionate number of blacks have been disenfranchised 
on the basis of their status as felons.209  It cautioned, however, that 
evidence of discrimination in the “prosecution or sentencing of felons” 
might prove that felons have been disenfranchised on account of race.210
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2004.
 
211
 
 205. Id. at 104 (quoting Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).  
Specifically, Muntaqim asserted that even if the New York legislature did not intend to 
discriminate, the statute violates the Voting Rights Act because it results in a “dilution” of 
black and Hispanic voters in New York City.  He also claimed that the disparity in prison 
populations—blacks and Hispanics are 30% of the state’s population, but constitute eighty 
percent of its prisoners—is caused by discriminatory sentencing.  Furthermore, he asserted 
that because more than eighty percent of blacks and Hispanics in state prisons hail from 
New York City and its vicinity, not only is he disenfranchised, but the minority vote in New 
York City is diluted; both are in violation of the Voting Rights Act.  Id. at 105. 
  After initially denying 
 206. Id. at 104. 
 207. Id. at 116-17.  The court cited the following statement to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: “The proposed amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is designed to 
restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bolden.”  Id. at 117-18 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192). 
 208. Id. at 117 (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) and 
discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973)).  See supra notes 132-138 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. 366 F.3d at 116-17. 
 210. Id. at 117. 
 211. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004), denying cert. to 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
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the petition,212 the Second Circuit agreed in December 2004 to a rehearing 
en banc.213
B. Ninth Circuit: Farrakhan v. Washington 
 
The previous year, the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion in 
Farrakhan v. Washington.214  In Farrakhan, minority felons in Washington 
sued the state for a violation of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 
claiming that the state’s felon disenfranchisement law was a race-based 
denial of their right to vote.215
The district court granted summary judgment for the state because, 
although minorities were disproportionately disenfranchised, the cause of 
that disparity was “external” to the . . .law” and thus was not the causal link 
between the voter’s qualification and the discriminatory result.
 
216  It found 
that while there was evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice 
system, it was insignificant in the totality of the circumstances because the 
statute was not enacted with discriminatory intent and the provision itself 
did not have that effect.217  The felons appealed.218
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the totality of the 
circumstances, noting that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
had been intended by Congress to remove the plaintiff’s burden of proving 
discriminatory intent.
 
219  If the felon disenfranchisement provision had to 
be discriminatory itself, there would be no point in examining the totality 
of the circumstances.220  Such a standard would, in effect, reinsert a 
discriminatory intent requirement into the Voting Rights Act.221  The court 
accepted the plaintiff’s contention that the state had “tenuous policy 
justifications” for its felon disenfranchisement law.222
 
 212. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 2004), denying reh’g en banc to 366 
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004). 
  It held that Section 
 213. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), granting reh’g en banc to 366 
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 214. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 215. Id. at 1011. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1014-15. 
 220. Id. at 1018. 
 221. Id. at 1019. 
 222. Id. at 1020 n.15.  The court noted with approval the district court’s citation of 
Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1972)), for its discussion of the 
policies underlying felon disenfranchisement.  The court also agreed with the district court 
that although Dillenburg is no longer good law, it remains “applicable” in terms of its policy 
analysis.  Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1020, n.15. 
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Two of the Voting Rights Act does reach felon disenfranchisement because 
it is a voting qualification and Section Two covers any voting qualification 
denying the right to vote in a discriminatory manner.223  States may 
disenfranchise felons without violating the Fourteenth Amendment under 
Richardson, but when it results in the denial of the right to vote or in a vote 
dilution based on race, the Voting Rights Act provides a remedy for 
disenfranchised persons on that basis.224  The court remanded the case to 
the district court for a re-examination of the interplay between 
discrimination in the criminal justice system and felon disenfranchisement 
within the totality of the circumstances.225
When the petition for a rehearing was denied,
 
226 Judge Kozinzki noted 
in his dissent that the plaintiffs never produced any evidence except 
statistical disparities,227 which was insufficient for a Section Two claim 
because “causation cannot be inferred from impact alone.”228  Moreover, 
he argued that the Voting Rights Act did not reach felon 
disenfranchisement because Congress had no such intent, and applying it 
that expansively would raise constitutional questions about Congress’s 
remedial reach under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.229
The intensity of Judge Kozinski’s dissent was fueled by his perception 
that the court had endangered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights 
Act.
 
230  He pointed out that while Section Two has been presumed 
constitutional, it has never actually been held to be so by the Supreme 
Court has never ruled on this question.231
 
 223. Id. at 1016. 
  The Court has traditionally 
interpreted the Voting Rights Act narrowly based on constitutionality 
 224. Id.  For a discussion of Richardson v. Ramirez, see supra notes 83-108 and 
accompanying text. 
 225. Id. at 1011-12. 
 226. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), denying reh’g to 338 F.3d 
1009 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 227. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 1118; see Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring plaintiffs to prove more than statistical disparities in 
unrelated areas for a Section Two violation); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City 
Comm’rs, 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring a “causal connection” between the electoral 
qualification law and the discrimination resulting in a denial of voting rights); Salas v. S.W. 
Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Section Two claim 
because the disparity in school board voter turnout rates was not caused by discrimination). 
 229. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1120-24. 
 230. Id. at 1124. 
 231. Id.; see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Court has assumed, without directly addressing, the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act, and citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
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concerns.232
C.  Eleventh Circuit: Johnson v. Governor of Florida 
 
Litigation in the Eleventh Circuit has been closely scrutinized because 
the Johnson233 case implicates election law in Florida, where President 
Bush clinched the presidency by such a small margin in 2000.234
The Eleventh Circuit considered claims under both the Voting Rights 
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment in Johnson v. Governor of Florida.
  Unlike 
Muntaqim in New York and Farrakhan in Washington, Johnson was 
decided in a southern state whose history and laws are more likely to 
exhibit manifestations of past racism. 
235  
The plaintiffs236 alleged that the felon disenfranchisement provision in the 
Florida Constitution of 1868 was adopted with discriminatory intent, 
continues to carry that intent despite its re-enactment in 1968, and 
continues to have the intended discriminatory effect.237
For a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to be established, 
discriminatory intent must be proven as a “substantial or motivating 
factor”;”
 
238 disparate impact alone is not enough.239  Because past intent 
can carry into the future despite amendment or lack of current intent, where 
current impact is still evident,240
 
 232. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1124; see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 
321-22 (2000) (refusing to adopt appellants’ interpretation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act because such a reading would exacerbate “federalism costs” to the point of raising 
constitutionality concerns). 
 the court launched into an extensive 
 233. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 234. See generally Litwin, supra note 10. 
 235. 353 F.3d at 1292. 
 236. A New York civil rights group, The Brennan Center, and Florida attorneys filed the 
case on behalf of disenfranchised felons in Florida.  Litwin, supra note 10, at 236. 
 237. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1293. 
 238. Id.; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265-66 (1977). 
 239. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1293.  The court dramatically illustrated the disparate impact 
felon disenfranchisement has in Florida: More than 600,000 people cannot vote, and 10.5 
percent of voting age black Floridians are in this group, as opposed to 4.4 percent of the 
non-black population.  In all, one in six black men in Florida is disenfranchised.  Id. 
 240. Id. at 1294.  The decision cites a number of cases, most of which regard school 
desegregation, to make its point about original intent surviving through time.  Id. at 1294 n.5 
(citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1997); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 
1989); Brown v. Bd. of School Comm’rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), aff’d, 706 
F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 464 U.S. 807 (1983); and McMillan v. Escambia County, 
638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981)).  These cases can be distinguished on a number of grounds.  
For example, Kirksey, Irby, and Brown all imply “neutral” action or lack of serious 
amendment of the law in question.  See id.  The Feeney case “impl[ies], in an equal 
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discussion of the history of Florida’s felon disenfranchisement 
provision.241
The Johnson court savaged Florida’s 1868 felon disenfranchisement 
provision.  It noted that when the state’s constitutional convention was 
initially controlled by Radical Republicans, felon disenfranchisement was 
omitted.
 
242  However, moderate Republicans subsequently gained control 
of the convention and reinstated it.243  The court noted that two convention 
delegates bragged about their restriction of the black vote, though it 
acknowledged that it was debatable whether these boasts referred to the 
Constitution as a whole or to the felon disenfranchisement provisions 
specifically.244
As Judge Kravitch pointed out in her dissent, however, Florida first 
denied felons the vote in 1838.
 
245  Almost thirty years later, in 1865, the 
state’s first post-Civil War Constitution still denied blacks the vote and thus 
had to be replaced in 1868.246  At least five black delegates at the 1868 
convention supported the felon disenfranchisement provision.247  Kravitch 
considered the racist comments of a few delegates to the 1868 convention 
as not contextually relevant to the specific provision in question.248
The majority’s Voting Rights Act analysis used the results test, in view 
of the totality of the circumstances, including “social and historical 
conditions.”
 
249
 
protection claim, that the purpose of the current Massachusetts veterans preference law may 
be located in its 1896 origins despite a number of amendments, including eliminations and 
extensions.”  Id.  The Massachusetts law was frequently amended only to include the 
veterans of new wars and conflicts being fought, however, but was otherwise “substantially 
the same.”  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 267.  Further, the “purpose of the current . . . law” as 
regards the “women’s requisitions” exemption, “dates back to the 1896 veterans’ preference 
law and was retained in the law substantially unchanged until it was eliminated in 1971.”  
Id. at 266 n. 22.  Johnson, however, is distinguishable because it involved a law that was 
neither initially discriminatory nor was it substantially unchanged over time.  See infra notes 
  The court held that the district court erred when it rejected 
plaintiffs’ voting rights claims by misapplying the totality of the 
340-347 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, Judge Kravitch’s dissent points out that 
these cited cases are inapposite because “this circuit has been reluctant to extend the 
education line of cases to other areas.  As this court stated in Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 
178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999), school desegregation jurisprudence is unique and thus 
difficult to apply in other contexts.”  Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1313. 
 241. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1294-96. 
 242. Id. at 1295. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1296. 
 245. Id. at 1308. 
 246. Id. at 1309 (noting that the 1868 replacement still denied felons the right to vote). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1309 n.2. 
 249. Id. at 1303-04. 
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circumstances standard to the evidence.250  Thus, its conclusion that their 
disenfranchisement was due to their conviction as felons—not racial 
discrimination—was incorrect.251
The court rejected the contention that the Voting Rights Act does not 
reach felon disenfranchisement.
 
252  It explained that Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act are compatible because 
non-discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws that are racially neutral 
both on their face and as applied would pass muster.253  In remanding the 
case, the court concluded that the taint of racism behind Florida’s 1868 
felon disenfranchisement provision constituted a violation of equal 
protection, unless it could be shown that it was cleansed by subsequent 
amendment.254  It suggested that this could not be demonstrated, as there 
was no “legitimate policy reason” to have kept felon disenfranchisement in 
the 1968 constitution.255
Judge Kravitch’s dissent attacked the majority’s ruling on both 
Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act grounds.
 
256  She wrote that 
Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law had been cleansed of any racist 
intent when it was reenacted by the constitutional convention of 1968.257  
She echoed Muntaqim and Judge Kozinski’s dissent in the Eleventh 
District in stating that the Voting Rights Act was never intended to reach 
felon disenfranchisement—in either its 1965 or 1982 incarnations—and 
that the majority’s interpretation would allow a statute to trump a 
constitutional amendment.258
The Eleventh Circuit vacated Johnson in July 2004 and granted a 
rehearing en banc.
 
259
 
 250. Id. at 1304-05. 
 
 251. See id. at 1305. 
 252. Id. at 1306. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1301. 
 255. Id. at 1301 n.16.  The opinion claims that “a few courts” have proffered non-
discriminatory reasons to deny suffrage to felons and cites Green v. Board of Elections of 
New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), and Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 
(1884).  It then says “others” have questioned those rationales, citing Marshall’s dissent in 
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79-82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Farrakhan v. 
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash. 1997), and Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 
1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970).  It goes on to cite a number of law review articles, but no 
Supreme Court cases.  Id. 
 256. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1308. 
 257. Id. at 1309-14. 
 258. Id. at 1314-15. 
 259. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), granting reh’g to and 
vacating 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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D. Current Status of the Conflict 
In 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Farrakhan260 and 
Muntaqim261 cases.  Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its holding in 
Johnson and has granted a full rehearing en banc.262  The Second Circuit 
followed suit in December 2004, granting a rehearing en banc for 
Muntaqim.263  Whatever the outcome in the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson will 
almost assuredly reach the Supreme Court.264  Indeed, while the Court was 
considering Farrakhan and Muntaqim, briefs were filed with the Court 
asking it to deny certiorari and instead wait for the Johnson case, as it may 
present a clearer presentation of the issue.265
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The confusion in the circuits reveals some of the underlying 
controversies regarding felon disenfranchisement.  It is well established 
that felon disenfranchisement is permissible under the Fourteenth 
Amendment unless a law was enacted with discriminatory intent.266  Less 
clear are the issues of whether the Voting Rights Act reaches felon 
disenfranchisement267 and what is the proper standard for measuring when 
a felon disenfranchisement law has been cleansed of prior discriminatory 
intent.  Opponents of felon disenfranchisement may well be disappointed in 
the results of their litigation strategy.268
 
 260. Farrakhan v. Wash., 125 S. Ct. 477 (2004), denying cert. to 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
  Such a failure will then refocus the 
 261. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004), denying cert. to 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 262. Johnson, 377 F.3d at 1163-64. 
 263. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), granting reh’g in banc to 366 
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 264. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Declines to Hear 2 Cases Weighing the 
Right of Felons to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A19. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1996).  Judge Feinberg agreed on this 
point in his dissent, noting that “States have the right to disenfranchise felons; § 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes that clear.  States, however, do not have the right to 
disenfranchise felons on the basis of race.”  Id. at 937 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). 
 267. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 268. “To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its 
holding is . . . unexceptionable.”  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (citing Davis v. 
Beason, 133 U.S. 535 (1886)).  Perhaps the first appearance of the strategy for eliminating 
felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act is Andrew Shapiro’s note, 
Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 
published in the 1993 Yale Law Journal.  See generally Shapiro, supra note 63 (emphasis 
added).  In his Note, Shapiro elucidated his “new litigation strategy.”  Id. at 543. 
In part, this litigation strategy is a belated response to the intentionally racist use 
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issue on the policy rationales for the practice and move the issue back to its 
proper forum in the state legislatures. 
A.  The Voting Rights Act Does Not Reach Felon Disenfranchisement 
The question is not whether Congress had the power to enact the Voting 
Rights Act, but whether the Voting Rights Act reaches felon 
disenfranchisement under Congress’s powers.269  States have primary 
responsibility for criminal law and for regulating elections.270  If the 
provision in question is just a way of punishing felons, allowing the Voting 
Rights Act to reach it would invade the states’ traditional jurisdiction.271  In 
addition, it would be inconsistent for the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to permit felon disenfranchisement in Section Two, but allow 
Congress to prohibit it without evidence of discrimination or discriminatory 
intent.272
Congress must have been aware of felon disenfranchisement when it 
passed the Voting Rights Act; thus, its silence cannot be interpreted as an 
intent to reach these laws.
 
273  Congressional reports from 1965 provide that 
tests for morality or good standing with regard to voting should be 
scrutinized, but felon disenfranchisement laws should not.274  The Judiciary 
Committee stated that the “ban on historically discriminatory ‘tests or 
devices,’ including the prohibition on tests for ‘good moral character’” did 
not implicate felon disenfranchisement laws.275
 
of criminal disenfranchisement throughout the South a century ago.  In practical 
terms, it is a plan that relies on the fact that criminal disenfranchisement laws have 
a disproportionate impact on minority offenders.  But the goal of this strategy, as 
stated at the outset of this Note, is not to make disenfranchisement laws “race 
neutral” or even primarily to reverse the disenfranchisement of nonwhite 
offenders.  Rather, the goal is to harness the power of the Voting Rights Act’s 
results test to attack criminal disenfranchisement laws where they are most 
vulnerable.  If construed properly, the Act could go a long way toward abolishing 
criminal disenfranchisement and restoring the right to vote to a class of millions of 
powerless citizens. 
  Senator Tydings of 
Maryland remarked that felon disenfranchisement is of a different character 
than literary tests or other such tools.  “Let me emphasize that [the Voting 
Id. at 566.  Roger Clegg describes Shapiro’s article as a “key movement source.”  Clegg, 
supra note 14. 
 269. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 121. 
 270. Id. at 121-22. 
 271. Id. at 122. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 123-24. 
 274. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 275. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-162, at 24 
(1965), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562). 
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Rights Act] does not include a requirement that an applicant for voting or 
registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony or mental 
disability . . . . [t]hese grounds for disqualification are objective, easily 
applied, and do not lend themselves to fraudulent manipulation.”276
Richardson’s emphasis on the “controlling significance” of the framers’ 
intent
 
277
Critics point to Congress’s reaction after Bolden in amending the Voting 
Rights Act to eliminate any intent requirement for Section Two claims;
 should be no less true in construing the Voting Rights Act than in 
construing the Fourteenth Amendment. 
278 
yet Bolden was not a felon disenfranchisement case.279  Furthermore, 
nothing in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments indicates that 
Congress intended Section Two to reach felon disenfranchisement.280
Applying the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement does indeed 
“raise serious constitutional questions.”
 
281  In Boerne, the Supreme Court 
struck down a law because it expanded the scope of Congress’s remedial 
abilities under the Fourteenth Amendment.282  Similarly, the results test of 
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act was enacted using the enforcement 
mechanisms of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, yet it is 
“settled” that those amendments can only be violated where there is 
purposeful discrimination.283
Judge Feinberg wrote in Baker that Congress is empowered to take 
remedial action under the Fourteenth Amendment where there is a racially 
discriminatory result.
  If the Voting Rights Act reaches felon 
disenfranchisement and Section Two of the Act does not require a showing 
of purposeful intent, its scope is broader than the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendments; consequently, the results test would reach conduct that does 
not necessarily violate those amendments. 
284
 
 276. Id. at 930 (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S8,366 (1965)). 
  Further, he stated the Reconstruction 
Amendments were meant to upset the balance between the state and federal 
 277. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 154-162, 165 and accompanying text. 
 279. Bolden concerned an at-large voting system in municipal elections.  City of Mobile, 
Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980). 
 280. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2003).  In Baker v. 
Pataki, Judge Mahoney stated that the framers of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and of the 
1982 amendments did not intend to outlaw felon disenfranchisement and did not find that 
felon disenfranchisement laws were a pretext for racial discrimination.  Baker, 85 F.3d at 
929-32; accord Farrakhan v. Wash., 359 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 281. Baker, 85 F.3d at 922. 
 282. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text. 
 283. Baker, 85 F.3d at 926 (Feinberg, J., concurring). 
 284. Id. at 937. 
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governments and already had that effect.285  Yet Boerne instructs us that 
Congress may exercise its enforcement powers under the Reconstruction 
Amendments only when addressing a pattern of violations with a remedy 
that is congruent and proportional.286  First, there must be a judicially 
protected right with a history and pattern of violations, documented by 
Congress, before Congress can enact appropriate legislation aimed at 
remedying it.287  Congress has put forth no such evidence concerning felon 
disenfranchisement, or even claimed that such laws discriminate.288  
Instead, when Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 
1993289 to facilitate voter registration, it explicitly recognized felon status 
as a legitimate basis for a state to deny voting rights.290  Second, the 
remedy must be congruent and proportional.291  The Voting Rights Act as 
applied to felon disenfranchisement laws is too broad, too blunt and too 
attenuated.292  Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Farrakhan, stating that the 
majority has endangered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, 
may prove prescient.293
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Passes Muster Under the Voting Rights 
Act 
 
Even assuming that the Voting Rights Act reaches felon 
disenfranchisement, denying felons suffrage would still pass muster 
because statistical evidence of disparate impact alone is not enough for a 
violation.  Moreover, a causal connection between felon 
disenfranchisement laws and discrimination based on race cannot be 
demonstrated in the totality of the circumstances. 
1. Causation 
As stated in Farrakhan, “causation cannot be inferred from impact 
alone.”294
 
 285. Id. at 938; see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); City of 
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980). 
  Although the word “results” does appear in the Voting Rights 
 286. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 120; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 287. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 120; see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 365 (2001). 
 288. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 125. 
 289. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg (1993). 
 290. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 125-26. 
 291. Id. at 120. 
 292. Id. at 124-25. 
 293. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 294. Id. at 1118; see Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 
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Act, it does not proscribe all voting qualifications which have a racially 
disproportionate impact.295  There must be a connection between the voter 
qualification and the alleged discrimination that results in the denial of the 
right to vote.296
None of the recent circuit cases have demonstrated this connection.  
Farrakhan and Johnson both purported to, but the rancorous dissents to 
both decisions cast doubt on these claims.
 
297  For example, the plaintiffs in 
Farrakhan did not dispute five of the eight claims the state made in its 
statement of material facts to support its motion for summary judgment.298  
Instead, “[t]o substantiate their vote denial claim . . . [p]laintiffs presented 
statistical evidence of the disparities in arrest, bail and pre-trial release 
rates, charging decisions, and sentencing outcomes in certain aspects of 
Washington’s criminal justice system.”299
There may be a correlation between being black and being a 
disenfranchised felon but that does not mean it is because of race, only that 
more African-Americans are disenfranchised on account of their status as 
felons.
 
300  Felons are disenfranchised upon their “conscious decision” to 
break the law, “for which they assume the risks of detection and 
punishment,” not because of their race.301  This is the fundamental point—
it is felons, not minorities, that are disenfranchised by these laws.  The high 
percentage of minorities in prison is a cause for serious concern, but the 
“ability of the judiciary to confront the underlying reasons for this 
phenomenon is limited.”302
 
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 
 295. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116.  “A violation of § 1973 occurs only when ‘a certain 
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an 
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred 
representatives.’”  Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). 
 296. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 297. Kozinski’s dissent in Farrakhan claimed that the plaintiff had “produced only 
evidence of statistical disparities in an area external to voting.”  Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 
1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  In Johnson, Kravitch’s dissent responded to the majority’s 
extensive recitation of the racial impact of felon disenfranchisement in Florida by 
emphasizing that plaintiff’s evidence was entirely comprised of statistical disparities, 
insufficient to establish a causal connection.  Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 
1318 n.16 (11th Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
 298. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003).  The claims disputed 
by the plaintiff regarded the operation of felon disenfranchisement laws and American 
Indians.  Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-17. 
 301. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 302. Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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2. Totality of the Circumstances 
Because a causal connection between felon disenfranchisement laws and 
intentional discrimination resulting in a loss of the right to vote or voting 
dilution on account of race is difficult to establish, some courts have 
attempted to shoehorn their analyses into the rubric of “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis.  This, however, is entirely vague,303
The Senate Report provides a list of “typical factors” to be considered in 
the totality of the circumstances test, but it is not exhaustive and is lacking 
a mechanical formula for applying them.
 and leads to 
incongruous results depending on what is encompassed within the meaning 
of the phrase “totality of the circumstances.” 
304  Further, the list is not 
controlling, leading to analyses which are highly individualistic and fact-
intensive.305  Johnson noted that the plaintiffs produced evidence as to 
racially-polarized voting, a history of official discrimination, the use of 
voting procedures to reduce minority participation, and disparate effects 
from education, employment, and health.306  In contrast, the Farrakhan 
court considered discrimination in the criminal justice system in the context 
of the discrimination under the “education, employment, and health” 
factor.307  It found a violation given how the challenged voting practice 
“interacts with external factors such as ‘social and historical conditions’” 
that result in disenfranchisement on the basis of race.308
While the Senate Report’s list of “typical factors” are not exhaustive, if 
discrimination in the criminal justice system is as pervasive as alleged, it is 
worth noting that Congress did not include it on the list.
 
309  Even if there is 
evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system, felon 
disenfranchisement laws would not violate Section Two of the Voting 
Rights Act because the discrimination would be in the criminal justice 
system, not in the disenfranchisement statutes themselves.  Discrimination 
in the criminal justice system does not establish that blacks have “less 
opportunity . . . to elect legislators of their choice.”310  In White311
 
 303. See Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 500 (2d Cir. 1999) (Leval, J., concurring) 
(noting that “[t]his standard is exceptionally vague. . . .[And the] specified factors [in the 
Senate Report] . . . give little guidance as to what constitutes a violation of the act.”), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1138 (2000). 
 and 
 304. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 307. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 308. Id. at 1011-12. 
 309. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the criminal 
justice system was not “isolated” as a factor by Congress). 
 310. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005). 
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Gingles, the Supreme Court recognized that discrimination in education, 
employment, and health can lead to violations of the Voting Rights Act.312  
Both of these cases are more than twenty years old, neither was a criminal 
case, and both had a multitude of other factors present.313  In contrast, in 
Muntaqim, Farrakhan and Johnson, none of the plaintiffs pleaded other 
factors.  Indeed, they could not have done so because a quick survey of 
typical factors such as racially-polarized voting, access to candidate slating 
procedures, large election districts, racial appeals in campaigns, and the 
responsiveness of elected officials inter alia, reveals them to be 
substantially related to elections and voting directly—not to crime or the 
criminal justice system.  White and Gingles each dealt with the effects of 
discrimination on voting and elections directly, not through an intermediate 
step, such as the criminal justice system.314
The “totality of the circumstances” analyses employed in Johnson and 
Farrakhan were less than total.  Both courts failed to consider that the 
history of felon disenfranchisement makes it fundamentally different than 
voting qualifications which were expressly used to deny black suffrage.
 
315  
As the Baker court noted, “Prior to 1890, apparently no Southern State 
required proof of literacy, understanding of constitutional provisions or of 
the obligations of citizenship, or good moral character, as prerequisites to 
voting. . . .  However . . . these tests and devices were soon to appear in 
most of the States with large Negro populations.”316
 
 311. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973). 
  Yet at the time the 
 312. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 65-66 (1986); see Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977). 
As proof of denial of access to the Hinds County political process, the plaintiffs 
presented substantial unrefuted evidence showing a past record of racial 
discrimination engaged in by the county and of official unresponsiveness to the 
needs of the county’s black citizens . . . . We will not restate [the evidence] but 
briefly note that it included the existence of these factors: no black’s [sic] ever 
having been elected to Hinds County office; poll taxes and literacy tests as 
impediments to voting; segregation principles adopted by political parties; 
property ownership requirements to run for offices; disproportionate education, 
employment, income level and living conditions between whites and blacks in 
Hinds County; alleged bloc voting; requirement of a majority for election; 
prohibition against single-shot voting; systematic exclusion of blacks from juries; 
levy and maintenance of taxes for a dual school system.  In short plaintiffs proved 
the presence in Hinds County of almost every significant factor indicative of 
denial of access to the political process. 
Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143-44. 
 313. For discussions of White and Gingles, see supra notes 132-138, 163-169 and 
accompanying text. 
 314. See id. 
 315. See supra notes 219-229, 245-251 and accompanying text. 
 316. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, eighty percent of all states 
had already disenfranchised felons.317  The purpose of those laws could not 
have been to evade the Amendment.318  Further, there are “legitimate and 
compelling rationale[s]” for disenfranchising felons.319
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement portray the practice as 
originating sui generis in the South as part of an overarching and 
continuing scheme to subjugate blacks.
 
320  They are willfully 
misrepresenting history.321  Today, twelve states fully disenfranchise 
felons, and only four are former Confederate states.322  Some of the 
“harshest” of these laws are in states that were never part of the 
Confederacy and have very small black populations.323  For example, 
Wyoming’s population is only 0.8 percent black324 and Iowa’s only 2.1 
percent.325
 
11-12 (1965), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2443). 
  Moreover, none of the laws that were enacted in the South after 
 317. Clegg, supra note 14. 
 318. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 123 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 319. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986).  For a discussion of Wesley, 
see the text accompanying notes 170-174. 
 320. See, e.g., One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1944 (“Florida, like Alabama, has 
denied the franchise to convicted felons since Reconstruction.”).  While perhaps technically 
true, this proposition ignores the promises regarding felon disenfranchisement in Florida’s 
1838 and 1865 constitutions.  See supra notes 245-246.  Additionally, felon 
disenfranchisement in Alabama dates back to 1819.  See supra note 19. 
 321. See Clegg, supra note 14. 
Brent Staples, the ‘Editorial Observer’ for the New York Times, wrote recently 
that ‘legal scholars attribute [felon disenfranchisement] to this country’s 
difficulties with race.’  This summer the Washington Post said these laws ‘are a 
vestige of a time when states sought to discourage blacks from voting.’  USA 
Today had earlier editorialized, ‘Voting bans are rooted in the nation’s racist past.’  
And recently a Reuters story (corrected after I talked with them) asserted that 
these laws ‘have roots in the post-Civil War 19th century and were aimed at 
preventing black Americans from voting.’  But it is simply not true that the reason 
felons are disenfranchised in the United States is because of a desire to keep 
blacks from voting. The reason our bien pensants are making assertions to the 
contrary is perhaps because they are being misled by the well-funded and 
ubiquitous felon-reenfranchisement movement. 
Id. 
 322. Bill “to Secure the Federal Voting Rights of Persons Who Have Been Released from 
Incarceration”: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Roger Clegg, Vice President and 
General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity), [hereinafter Clegg, H.R. 906 Statement], 
available at http://www.ceousa.org/clegg2.html (Oct. 21, 1999). 
 323. See Clegg, supra note 14. 
 324. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: WYOMING, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56000.html (last revised Sept. 30, 2005). 
 325. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: IOWA, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19000.html (last revised Sept. 30, 2005). 
BROOKSCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:06 PM 
2005 FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 139 
Reconstruction with the intent to disenfranchise blacks are still on the 
books today.326
B.  The Fourteenth Amendment is Controlling 
 
If the Voting Rights Act does not reach felon disenfranchisement, then 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the controlling standard for such laws.  The 
definitiveness of the Richardson court’s “affirmative sanction” seems to 
have foreclosed all challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless 
discriminatory intent can be shown.327
The proper balance has already been struck between legitimate felon 
disenfranchisement and that which is unconstitutionally motivated by racial 
bias.  Richardson v. Ramirez allows the states to enact felon 
disenfranchisement laws as expressly provided for in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
 
328  Hunter v. Underwood constrains this practice, so that 
where a state has disenfranchised felons as a method of surreptitiously 
denying black people the right to vote, it can be struck down.329  Prior 
intent, however, can be undone by subsequent amendment.330  This is not 
only a reasonable approach, but one that is consistent with the letter and the 
spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, our history, and with so-called 
“evolving standards of decency.”331  It is important to note that “past 
discrimination . . . in the manner of original sin, [cannot] condemn 
governmental action that is not itself unlawful,”332 and that forty-eight 
states currently practice felon disenfranchisement.333
The question then becomes: “When has a racially tainted law been 
cleansed of prior discriminatory intent?”  In Hunter v. Underwood, the 
Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that the proper standard for a 
  It should continue as 
the constitutional standard. 
 
 326. See Clegg, supra note 14. 
 327. See Price, supra note 70, at 383-84. 
 328. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
 329. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).  See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text. 
 330. See generally Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998).  For a discussion of 
Fordice, see supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
 331. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  Interestingly, the now familiar phrase 
“evolving standards of decency” originates in a case that cites felons as an example of a 
permissible reason for disenfranchisement.  Id. at 96-97 (“A person who commits bank 
robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote . . . . [B]ecause the 
purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this 
law is sustained as a[n] . . . exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.”); cf. supra note 
76 and accompanying text. 
 332. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980). 
 333. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of mixed motives 
was a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a “substantial 
or motivating factor,” unless it can be shown the same law would have 
been enacted regardless.334
Because Hunter did not decide whether or not revisions to Alabama’s 
felon disenfranchisement law by the courts had expunged the original taint 
of racism, this question was left open.
 
335  Fordice used this opening to find 
that Mississippi’s felon disenfranchisement law had been sanitized of the 
discriminatory intent evident at the time of its enactment.336  The court 
focused on the fact that the law was broadened in 1968 when “white” 
crimes, such as rape and murder, were added to the list.337  This change 
was approved by both houses of the state legislature and subsequently by 
the voters.338
The Johnson court used Hunter to set an impossibly high bar for 
cleansing discriminatory intent.
 
339  Florida’s original felon 
disenfranchisement law predates black enfranchisement, thus precluding 
any racial intent in the original law as only white men had the franchise at 
that time.340  Yet the court glossed over the law’s 1838 origins and its 
inclusion in the 1865 constitution and instead discussed the law as it dated 
from the state constitution of 1868, merely remarking that a law can be 
infected with discriminatory intent at any stage.341
 
 334. 471 U.S. at 224-25 (1985). 
  Despite the temporary 
omission of felon disenfranchisement from the early drafts of the 1868 
convention, it is reasonable to view its subsequent inclusion as a 
continuation of the 1838 and 1865 laws. 
 335. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 336. Id. at 391-92.  See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
 337. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J., 
dissenting). 
 340. Id. at 1309. 
 341. Id. at 1294-95.  Judge Kravitch, in dissent, stated that the court decided the wrong 
issue: It was Florida’s constitution of 1968, not 1868, that was before the court.  Id. at 1311 
n.4.  Moreover, she stated that the majority’s interpretation of the 1868 constitution is 
flawed, though it can be assumed there was “some racial animus” present in 1868.  Id. at 
1310.  She noted that Florida first denied felons the vote in 1838, which precludes any racial 
intent as only white men had the franchise at that time.  Id. at 1309.  Florida’s first post-
Civil War Constitution in 1865 still denied blacks the vote and thus had to be replaced in 
1868, but both also denied felons the vote.  Id.  Further, at least five black delegates at the 
1868 convention supported the felon disenfranchisement provision.  Id.  She also pointed 
out that the racist comments of a few delegates to the 1868 convention, to the effect that 
they had been successful in their enterprise to deny suffrage to blacks, are not contextually 
relevant to the specific provision in question.  Id. at 1309 n.2. 
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Even if discrimination was a motivating factor in 1868, however, Florida 
reenacted its felon disenfranchisement law in its 1968 constitution.  The 
majority in Johnson characterized the re-enactment as a casual discussion 
by a subcommittee of the convention, which was not enough to cleanse the 
1868 constitution’s intentional discrimination; it is not an “independent, 
non-discriminatory purpose.”342  The operative principle was that the state 
must break the “causal chain of discrimination.”343
But the reenactment of felon disenfranchisement in 1968 “conclusively 
demonstrates” that the legislature would have enacted the same law absent 
discriminatory motives.
 
344  The provision was actively and adequately 
considered in committee.345  The 1968 provision eliminated enumeration of 
specific crimes resulting in disenfranchisement and instead broadly 
excluded felons from suffrage.346  This breaks any “causal chain of 
discrimination” whereby “black” crimes were targeted and instead 
indicates intent to disenfranchise all felons regardless of race, which is 
consistent with the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.347  
The majority claims the provision was inadequately considered in 
committee.348  Applying this “consideration-in-committee” standard to 
felon disenfranchisement as it was considered in 1868, would the court find 
that if the consideration given to this issue was inadequate, then the statute 
had never been infected with discriminatory intent as claimed?349
 
 342. Id. at 1301. 
  
 343. Id. at 1298; see also Knight v. Ala., 14 F.3d 1534, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(reversing the district court’s ruling that current allocation of grants was not a vestige of 
segregation, due to the absence of a break in the causal chain). 
 344. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1311 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
 345. Id. at 1314. 
The 1968 Constitution’s felon disenfranchisement rule was first actively 
considered by the Suffrage and Elections Committee.  The record reflects that the 
committee discussed the provision, debated proposed changes, and ultimately 
decided to adopt the present provision, which is different from the 1868 provision.  
The committee also considered an alternative motion that would have eliminated 
the disenfranchisement rule to felons released from incarceration.  After 
discussion, the alternative motion failed.  The new constitution was then accepted 
by the full committee, approved by both legislative houses, and affirmed by a 
state-wide referendum—all without any allegation of racial bias. 
Id. 
 346. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1335. 
 347. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1308-11 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 92-94 
and accompanying text. 
 348. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1301-02. 
 349. Id. at 1308 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). 
The plaintiffs’ expert states voter apportionment and the appointment (rather than 
election) of many political posts were the most significant and well-known issues 
of [the] 1868 Constitutional Convention, while felon disenfranchisement was a 
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Regardless, the political machinations—absent discriminatory intent—
behind how this provision of the Florida state constitution was adopted are 
not part of a proper analysis; the Supreme Court rejected a “political 
exigency” argument in Richardson.350
Not only the does Johnson examine the wrong law, it misapplies the 
Hunter standard, which requires only that “legislators would have enacted 
the felon disenfranchisement provision if they did not have an 
impermissible motive.”
 
351  The Johnson majority uses a different standard 
which would require a consideration of whether the constitutional 
convention knew both of the prior discriminatory intent and effect and then 
reenacted the provisions for different reasons.352
The Supreme Court in Hunter found that judicial amendments did not 
cleanse discriminatory laws of prior intent.
 
353  In contrast, like the 
Mississippi law in Fordice, the 1968 Florida provision at issue in Johnson 
was the product of a constitutional convention and was subsequently 
approved by both houses of the legislature and in a voter referendum; it is 
not a mere statute or judicial decree.354  Hunter is also distinguishable 
because in that case the Alabama legislature acted quickly after the end of 
de jure segregation to try to perpetuate it in another form.355  Florida’s law, 
however, was amended and reenacted a century after the provision may 
have been infected with discriminatory intent.356  There was no 
discriminatory intent present in reenacting felon disenfranchisement in 
Florida in 1968; none was even alleged by the plaintiff.357
 
relatively minor issue. In fact, the plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that the 
historical record is mixed on the felon disenfranchisement provision. 
 
Id. at 1309 n.2. 
 350. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974). 
Nor can we accept respondents’ argument that because [Section Two] was made 
part of the Amendment “largely through the accident of political exigency rather 
than through the relation which it bore to the other sections of the Amendment,” 
we must not look to it for guidance in interpreting [Section One].  It is as much a 
part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and how it became a part of 
the Amendment is less important than what it says and what it means. 
Id. 
 351. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1311. 
 352. Id. at 1311-12. 
 353. Id. at 1312 n.6; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985). 
 354. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1314; see also Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 
1998); supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text. 
 355. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1313; see Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-30. 
 356. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1309. 
 357. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Johnson, 
353 F.3d at 1309. 
Comment [C.E.L1]: I also found these sentences 
confusing, and perhaps not needed for the larger 
argument.  The last sentence, if you want to keep it, I 
think might benefit from unpacking to tie it into the 
rest of the paragraph. 
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C.  Felon Disenfranchisement is a Policy Matter That Belongs in State 
Legislatures 
The right to vote is not unqualified.358  The establishment of specific 
electoral qualifications for voters is delegated by the Constitution to the 
states.359  Courts have repeatedly upheld the power of the states to make 
appropriate qualifications.360  The real issue is whether disenfranchising 
felons is an appropriate policy.  That is a question that is better suited for 
state legislatures than the courts.361
1. Felon Disenfranchisement Serves Legitimate Policy Ends 
 
A number of policy reasons have been advanced by proponents to justify 
felon disenfranchisement.  Some of these are vulnerable to legitimate 
criticism.  One frequently cited justification is that because felons have 
already shown their willingness to break the law, allowing them to vote 
would increase the likelihood of voter fraud.362  This is a weak justification 
as there is little evidence to show that felons are more likely to engage in 
voter fraud than anyone else.363
Supporters also claim that the exclusion of felons from the voting booth 
is necessary to prevent harmful changes to the law.
 
364
 
 358. See supra notes 
  The Green court 
16-17 and accompanying text.  Additionally, children, the insane, 
and aliens may not vote. 
 359. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Art. I, § 4 
provides in relevant part, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
ch[oo]sing Senators.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.  The argument that Section Four provides a 
way for Congress to circumvent the states’ powers to make voter qualifications given in 
Section Two fails because Section Four only gives Congress authority to prescribe 
conditions for “holding” elections, not for electors.  See Clegg, H.R. 906 Statement, supra 
note 322. 
 360. See e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“Th[e] ‘equal right to vote,’ 
is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate 
access to the franchise in other ways.”) (internal citations omitted); Carrington v. Rash, 380 
U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (“There can be no doubt either of the historic function of the States to 
establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution, other 
qualifications for the exercise of the franchise.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The Constitution does not in so many words confer a right to vote, though 
it has been held to do so implicitly.  Rather, it confers on the states broad authority to 
regulate the conduct of elections, including federal ones.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 361. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974). 
 362. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1303. 
 363. Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 386. 
 364. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1302-03. 
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used the specter of “mafiosi” voting to justify the practice.365  While at first 
glance this claim seems spurious, opponents of felon disenfranchisement 
have pointed out how concentrated felons are in a handful of inner city 
communities.366  Especially when the issue is vote dilution, it is not 
unimaginable that a large block of criminals in a district could swing an 
election to a candidate who does not tout the “tough on crime” line.  
Indeed, Democrats rely on the assumption that convicted felons will affect 
election outcomes as they seek to enfranchise millions of sympathetic 
voters.367  Further, allowing millions of convicted felons into the voting 
booths of a small number of predominately minority districts would 
aggravate this impact and could conceivably infringe on the ability of law-
abiding “members [of a protected class in those districts] . . . to elect 
representatives of their choice,”368 in contravention of the Voting Rights 
Act.369  The Supreme Court, moreover, has already made it clear that 
legislatures cannot seek to “fence out” a group of voters based upon how 
they might vote.370
A third justification offered is the purity of the ballot box: “A State has 
an interest in preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing 
from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose 
behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s aims.”
 
371  Critics 
respond by arguing that being convicted of a felony does not necessarily 
diminish one’s “moral competence” and that in any event, the result is to 
fence out groups of minority voters.372
 
 365. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967). 
  The Green court found that 
denying felons the right to vote was reasonable, in light of the Lockean 
 366. Muntaqim’s vote dilution claim was partially based on the fact that eighty percent of 
black and Hispanic inmates in New York State (who account for more than eighty percent 
of all inmates) come from the New York City area.  Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 
105 (2d Cir. 2004).  In Baker, plaintiffs alleged that seventy-five percent of New York 
State’s prison population came from fourteen assembly districts in New York City.  Baker v. 
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 367. Nearly seventy percent of disenfranchised felons may be Democrats.  UGGEN & 
MANZA, supra note 9, at 25.  That enfranchised felons could decide the outcome of close 
elections has been recognized since at least the Nineteenth Century.  See Washington v. 
State, 75 Ala. 582, 583 (1884). 
 368. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 369. See id; see also Clegg, supra note 14. 
 370. “‘Fencing out’ a sector of the population from the franchise because of the way they 
may vote is constitutionally impermissible.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) 
(citations omitted). 
 371. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971).  See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 372. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 390-91. 
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conception of the social contract373
it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that 
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators 
who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors 
who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to 
consider their cases.  This is especially so when account is taken of the 
heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized crime.
 as well as on more practical grounds 
since, 
374
As a policy justification, Locke’s social contract theory has withstood 
the test of time; it served as a rationale for the enactment of felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the past,
 
375 and remains a compelling argument 
today.  When someone commits a crime, he commits it not just against the 
victim, but against our entire society.376  Protests that time served is 
enough, and that society should prioritize the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of felons should fall on deaf ears.  Opponents of 
disenfranchisement claim that the inability to vote stymies felons’ 
“remittance into a law-abiding society.”377
Moreover, felon disenfranchisement is not the only collateral 
consequence society has imposed on felons.  Felons may be banned from 
holding elective office.
  Yet they neglect to explain why 
the tonic of voting did not curtail felons from committing crimes initially. 
378  They may also be barred from holding certain 
jobs,379 serving on juries,380 and receiving government benefits such as 
welfare and food stamps in certain circumstances.381  Sex offenders have to 
register with local authorities in some communities.382  Congress has also 
enacted laws that bar felons from owning handguns.383
 
 373. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967). 
  If qualifications 
 374. Id. 
 375. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 
21, 173 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 377. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 385. 
 378. See generally Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony 
Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801. 
 379. “Ex-offenders are formally excluded from many employment opportunities that 
require professional licenses. Such positions range from lawyer to bartender, from nurse to 
barber, from plumber to beautician. . . .  The Supreme Court has upheld the right of states to 
establish qualifications for entry into certain employment.”  Nora v. Demleitner, Preventing 
Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 156 (1999). 
 380. Id. at 157. 
 381. Id. at 158. 
 382. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 657 (2005). 
 383. See United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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can be placed on a felon’s constitutional rights to free association and to 
bear arms, voting should not be any different.384
Opponents claim that felon disenfranchisement is “anachronistic”
 
385 and 
“outmoded.”386  They argue that “constitutional concepts of equal 
protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian 
amber,”387 because “[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”388  Yet they attempt to 
freeze felon disenfranchise laws in a particular time and place; namely, the 
South, between Reconstruction and the Civil Rights movement.  They do 
not explain why centuries of prior non-discriminatory intent, non-
discriminatory laws enacted outside the South and recent, non-
discriminatory laws in liberal states like Massachusetts389 count for 
nothing.  It can be conceded that felon disenfranchisement was a 
component of a few states’ systematic endeavor to subordinate African-
Americans,390 but that does not mean these laws should be dispensed with 
wholesale.  After all, the Reconstruction Amendments themselves were 
twisted to the same end: the Supreme Court used the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in Plessy v. Ferguson to uphold the “separate but 
equal” doctrine,391 yet we have not dispensed with them.  Moreover, none 
of these laws is in place today and Richardson-Hunter already provides a 
tool whereby purposefully discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws 
can be eliminated.392
Justifications for felon disenfranchisement and arguments against the 
practice are policy arguments, which are the proper province of the 
legislatures.
 
393
 
 384. The Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to vote; rather, it does so 
“implicitly.”  Hall v. Simcox, 766 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1985).  The right of free association is 
expressly provided for in the Constitution as “the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble”.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The right to bear arms is also explicitly guaranteed by 
the Second Amendment of the Constitution which provides “the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
  At least some of the angry commentators get one thing 
 385. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1338. 
 386. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (referring to the contentions of anti-
disenfranchisement amici). 
 387. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972); see generally Portugal, 
supra note 12. 
 388. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
 389. See Behrens, supra note 13, at 255 n.129. 
 390. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 83-98, 109-118 and accompanying text. 
 393. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974); see Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 
396 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
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right: The way to change felon disenfranchisement laws is to campaign in 
state legislatures.394  Such approaches have had some effect.  For example, 
in 2000, Connecticut restored voting rights to convicted felons on 
probation, and Delaware amended its constitution so that it now re-
enfranchises felons five years after completion of their sentences, except 
for those convicted of murders, sex offenses and certain other crimes.395  
Not all news is good news on that front, however, for opponents of the 
practice—Kansas disenfranchised probationers in 2002, and Utah and even 
Massachusetts both recently expanded their felon disenfranchisement laws 
through voter approval of constitutional amendments.396  If Florida’s felon 
disenfranchisement law is struck down, it can be—and should be—
reenacted, just as Alabama’s law was after Hunter.397
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curia, are contentions 
that these notions are outmoded, and that the more modern view is that it 
is essential to the process of rehabilitating the exfelon [sic] that he be 
returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has 
completed the serving of his term.  We would by no means discount these 
arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh 
and balance them against those advanced in support of California’s 
present constitutional provisions.  But it is not for us to choose one set of 
values over the other.  If respondents are correct, and the view which they 
advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the 
people of the State of California will ultimately come around to that view.  
And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the 
fact that there are two sides to the argument.
  As the Richardson 
court wisely noted more than thirty years ago: 
398
CONCLUSION 
 
Felon disenfranchisement is plainly constitutional and consistent with 
the intent of the framers of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting 
Rights Act.  It is a practice with deep roots in history that continues to be 
widely utilized today.  It is fundamentally different than voter 
qualifications used in the past to suppress black voting. 
That African-Americans are disproportionately disenfranchised is a 
 
 394. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 397; One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 
1957-59; Price, supra note 70, at 407-08. 
 395. See Price, supra note 70, at 401. 
 396. See Behrens, supra note 13, at 255 n.129. 
 397. Alabama currently disenfranchises felons in prison, parolees, probationers, and 
certain ex-felons, although ex-felons can apply for reinstatement of voting rights.  FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 178, at 2-3. 
 398. Richardson, 418 U.S at 55. 
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matter of grave concern, but it is a side effect of high crime rates.  It flows 
from their status as felons, not from their race.  “Felons [are not] 
disenfranchised because of an immutable characteristic, such as race, but 
rather because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for 
which they assume the risks of detention and punishment.”399  If there is 
discrimination in the criminal justice system, activists should attack that 
phenomenon directly instead of focusing on a symptom.  Their fixation 
instead on disenfranchisement belies their political bias and motivation.400
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement claim the practice is part of a 
Republican strategy to suppress the predominately Democratic minority 
vote.
 
401  Yet, clearly, opponents and their Democratic allies have 
something to gain from the outcome of this issue as well.402  That 
recognition reinforces the notion that this is a political issue, and political 
issues belong before qualified voters and their elected representatives.403
 
 
 
 399. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 400. “[T]he number of Republican candidates that are being elected by only marginal 
leads is . . . alarming.”  Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 374 (emphasis added). 
 401. See Chin, supra note 37, at 306-07.  Contra Miles, supra note 183, at 122 (asserting 
that felon disenfranchisement has no discernible impact on voter turnout, and thus has few 
consequences for election results). 
 402. See generally UGGEN & MANZA, supra note 9. 
 403. Richardson, 418 U.S at 55. 
